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lliunicipal
28 Cal.2d 460, 464 [171 P.2c1 8].) [2] It
seems obvious that the refusal of the judge to rule on the
effect of the order for
allowance and his action in
transferring the
proceeding to the master calendar
department for
and trial did not constitute a decision
on the
of res
[3] While res judicata may
be a
the court in
which the case is
to pass upon the
question of whether or not the
is well taken. (Reidy v.
Cotrrt, 220 Cal.
112 [29 P.2d 780] ; Baird v.
Superior
204 Cal.
412-414 [268 P. 640] ; Liberty
Mnt. Ins. Co. v.
62 Cal.App.2d 601, 610-611
[145 P.2d 344]; Ooodman Bros., Inc. v.
Court, 51
Cal.App.2d 297, 304-~i06 [124 P.2d 644]; see Vitimin Milling
Corp. v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.2d 116, 121 [33 P.2d 1016];
cf. Donovan v. Superior Cm1rt, 39 Cal.2d 848, 851 [250 P.2d
246].) Accordingly, application for the writ is premature.
'rhe alternative writ of prohibition is discharged and the
peremptory writ is denied.
Shenk, J., Carter, J., 'rraynor, .J., and Schauer, J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6530.

In Bank.

July 5, 1955.]

HARRY C. STEINMETZ, Petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA
S'rATE BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Respondents.
[1] Public Employees-Construction of Statute.-Words "knowing
membership," as used in Gov. Code, § 1028.1, relating to duty
of public employee to appear before investigating body or committee and answer
as to his
in Communist Party or any organization advocating violent overthrow
of government, refer to person's knowledge of his membership
rather than to his knowledge of character of organization.
[2] !d.-Application of Statute.-Under Gov. Corle, § 1028.1, subd.
(d), relating to duty of public employee to appear before investigating body or committee and answer questions as to his
present knowing nwmbership in Communist Party or as to his
past knowing mPmbership in such party at any time smce

[1] See Cal.Jur.Supp. (1951-1955), Public Employees,§ 4.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 7, 8, 13, 14] Public Employees, § 4;
[ 4-6] Public Employees, § 5; [9, 11, 12] Public Employees § 6; [10]
Witnesses, § 18.
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September 10, 1948, it is proper to question such employee as
to fact of membership without reference to his knowledge of
character of organization, and questions on this point which
hP refuses to answer are not coYered by his denials that he was
knowingly a member with knowledge of nature of party.
!d.-Validity of Statute.--Gov. Code,§
to duty
of
to appear before
connnittce and answer
is not inYRlid
such
to answer questions as to his memberwithout regard to his knowledge of
nature of party.
!d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-A governmental body
may make reasonable inquiries into matters pertaining to fitness of its employees.
[5] !d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-Loyalty on part of
of those in public employment is important to orderly and depcwlahlc governnwnt and is, therefore, relevant to fitness for
such employment.
[6] !d.-Regulations-Loyalty and Fitness.-An employee's associates, as well as his conduct, are factors which may be considered by state agency in determining his loyalty, and information on that subject may properly be elicited from him.
[7] !d.-Construction of Statute.-Under statutes which provide
for
or disqualification of public employee because
of membership in proscribed organizations or refusal to take
oath
membership, knowledge of character of organizations is essential, and legislation is sustaincd only when it
or impliedly requires such knowledge.
[8] !d.-Construction of Statute.--Where statutes provide merely
for disclosuTe of information concerning public employee's
membership in proscribed organizations, requirr~ment that employee have knowledge of nature of organization is not necessary.
[9] Id.-Duty to Answer Questions.-Where public employee's refusal to answer questions asked him by governmental body as
to his past or present membership in Communist Party was
not based on claim of privilege against self-incrimination
under U.S. Const., 5th Amendment, or Cal. Const., art. I, ~ 13,
he is precluded from relying on these constitutional provisions
in n proceeding to compel ltis rein::tatcmrnt.
[10] Witnesses-Duty to Testify--Self-incrimination-Waiver of
Privilege.-A witness is required to claim privilege against
self-incrimination, which is personal privilege solely for his
benefit, and it is deemed waived unless ilwoked.
[11] Public Employees-Duty to Disclose Information.-A person
[10] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 21; Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 79, 84
et seq.

818

STEINMETz

v.

CAL. STATE BoARD OF EDucATION

[44 C.2d

may properly be required to disclose information relevant to
fitness and loyalty as reasonable condition for obtaining or
retaining public employment, though such disclosure, under
some circumstances, may amount to self-incrimination.
[12] Id.-Duty to Disclose Information.-A public employee cannot
be forced to give answer which may tend to incriminate him,
but he may be required to choose between disclosing information and losing his employment.
[13] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Gov. Code, § 1028.1, relating to
duty of public employee to appear before investigating body
or committee and answer questions, does not violate constitutional provision prohibiting passage of specials laws in certain
enumerated cases and "in all other cases where a general law
can be made applicable" ( Const., art. IV, § 25, subds. 1-33),
since such section does not fall within any of enumerated
categories, and, insofar as any of its provisions are specific,
no general law could have been made applicable.
[14] !d.-Validity of Statute.-Legislature, desiring to authorize
inquiry as to public employee's membership in Communist
Party, can do so only by naming it, and designation of such
organization in Gov. Code, § 1028.1, is not arbitrary but is
reasonably related to purpose of legislation, since information
as to membership in such party is pertinent to fitness for
public employment.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel petitioner's reinstatement as associate professor at a state college. "\Vrit
denied.
Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand
for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard L.
Mayers, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-Petitioner was dismissed from his position as an associate professor at San Diego State College
because of his refusal, at a hearing before the State Board
of JiJducation, to answer two questions as to whether he was
or had been a member of the Communist Party, and he seeks
a writ of mandate to compel his reinstatement.
The state board acted pursuant to section 1028.1 of the
Government Code, which is part of a statute commonly known
as the Luckel Act. Section 1028.1 provides that it shall be
the duty of any public employee, when ordered to do so,
to appear before the governing body of the state or local
agency by which he is employed and to answer under oath
questions relating to:
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'· ) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the
forceful o1· violent overthrow of the Gowrnment of the United
States or of any state.
"(b) Present lmmdng membership in any organization
uow advocating the forceful or violent overthrow of the
Government of the United States or of any state.
"
Past kno'IYing membership at any time since Septc~mbcr 10, 1948, in any organization whieh, to the knowledge
of such employee, during the time of the employee's membership advocated the forceful or violent overthrow of the
Goyermnent of the United States or of any state.
" (d) Questions as to present kno1ving· membership of such
<·mployee in the Communist Party or as to past knmving
membership in the Communist Party at any time sinctSeptember 10, 1948.''
The seetion further provides that ''.Any employee who fails
or refuses to appear or to answer under oath on any ground
whatsoeYer any such questions so propounded shall be guilty
of insubordination and guilty of violating this section and
shall be suspended and dismissed from his employment in
the manner provided by law."
At the hearing petitioner was examined by \Villiam Blair,
president of the State Board of Edncatiou, as follows:
Mn. BLAm : . . . Are you knowingly a member of the
Communist Party'?
Dn. STEI:'\liiE'rz: 1\Ir. Chairman. I am sorry, but I find
it neeessary to refuse to answer t1Jis question as I would if
yon asked me if I were a member of any other party because
[ do not believe that there is authority in the act under which
yon are proceecling for asking such a question.
MR. BLAIR: . . . HaYe you at any time since September
J 0, 1948, knowingly be<cn a member of the Communist Party?
DR. STEINliiE1'Z: In all good conscience I must give you
exactly the same answer now that I gaye you a moment
ago, sir.
NiR. BLAIR: That is, that you decline to answer.
DR. STEINliiETZ: Yes, sir.
JYIR. BLAIR: . . . Do you know whether or not the Communi.~t Party advocates the forceful or violent overthrow of
t h(~ p:overnment of the United States or of any state?
DR. STEINllfETZ: Mr. Blair, I have no such knowledge.
lYIR. BLAIR: Have you at any time since September 10,
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1948, to and including today, knowingly been a member of
the Communist Party when, to your knowledge, it advocated
the forceful or violent overthrow of the government of the
United States or of any state 7
DR. STEINMETZ: Mr. Blair. I have in part answered
this question when I disclaimed knowledge. I should like
further to answer it by saying that I have never in my life,
now, in the past, and so long as I would be a state employee,
'vould never belong to an organization that advocated force
and violence against the United States, this state, or any
snbdiYision thereof. I took an oath, the Levering Act oath,
and signed it honestly, . . . [Here petitioner recited in subthe Levering oath, Gov. Code, § 3103.]
lVIR. BLAIR: That was intended to be an answer to the
question "Have you at any time since September 10, 1948, to
and including today, knmvingly been a member of the Communist Party when to your knowledge it advocated the forceful
or violent overthrow of the government of the United States
or of any state?'' ·what would be your answer directly to
that question, Dr. StEinmetz?
DR. STEINJ\IETZ: Mr. Blair, in part I answered that when
I c1iselaimed knowledge, and in further part I have just
answered it by reaffirming the r~evering Act oath.
MR. BLAIR: I have repeated the question and I would
feel obliged to direct you to answer it "yes" or "no" or "I
refuse to answer." After that you may explain your answer,
if you have not already explained it.
DR.. STEINJVIE'rz : May I say that I have answered a
question ·with regard to membership by saying that I would
not ans·wer any question with regard to membership, and
that \vas very straightfonyard, and I have answered a question 'vith regard to knowledge by disclaiming that I had the
knowledge, and I have answel·cd a question with regard to
advocacy with an emphutic "No."
MR. BLAIR: Your ''no'' applies to what part of the question?
DR. STEINMETZ: To my advocacy, and to my knowledge,
and to membership 'vith knowledge.
MR. BLAIR: 'l'hese questions were all framed in the belief
that they could be in all fairness answered "yes" or "no."
DR. STEI~METZ: You consider a question like that fair,
1\Ir. Blair?
MR. BLAIR: It seems that it simply wishes to inquire
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whether you have knowingly been a member of the Communist Party when to your
it advocated the
forceful and Yiolent oyerthrow of the government. Now
ean you ansvYer that by-you can answer that by "yes" or
"no" or by refusal to answer it. If you take objection to
the form of it yon can refnse to ;cms1ver.
DR. STEINMETZ: Under
in principle on account
of rny belief 1vith my
that this is a
question, pressed as l feel I am, I answer it then ''no.''
MR. BLAIR: . . Do you
advocate the forceful
or Yiolcut ovcrthro\v of the
of the l~nited States
or of the government of any state of the United States?
DR. STEINMETZ: Mr. Blair, as a teacher and a free
American, I trnst, who
between incitement and
, I like no
but I
to
have already ans1vered it "no," and therefore, of course,
answer it the same way now.
MR. BLAIR: . . . Are you knowingly a member of any
organization whicb to your knowledge now adYocates the
forceful or violent overthrow of the goyernment of the United
States or of the government of any state of the United States?
DR. STEINMETZ: No, sir . . . .
l\1R. BLAIR: Have you at any time since September 10,
1948, knowingly been a member of any organization which
to your then knowledge adyocated
the time of your
membership the forceful or violent overthrow of the government of the United States or of the government of any state
of the United States?
DR. STEINMETZ: . . . I should like to answer the last question with a very decided "no."
The foregoing shows that, although petitioner answered
questions asked under subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of
section 1028.1 relating to his
advocacy of violent
overthrow of the government and his membership in organizations advocating violent overthrow of the government, he
refused to answer two questions asked under subdivision
(d), namely, (1) "Are you knowingly a member of the Communist Party?" and (2) "Have you at any time since September 10, 1948, knowingly been a member of the Communist
Party?'' His disc-harge was based upon this refusal.
Petitioner argues that, in effect, he answered the questions as to whether he was knowingly a member of the Com-
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munist Party when, at a later point in the examination, he
replied to the inquiry as to knowing membership in the party
with knowledge of its objectives. However, he refused to
answer inquiries which omitted the qualification of knowledge
and were directed only to
of the nature of the
'rhe word ''knowingly'' as used
which he declined to answer did not refer
of the aims of the party but merely to whether
he knew that he was a member, and it is clear from the record
that he so understood the word at the time he refused to
answer. In a memorandum submitted to the board at the
of the hearing,
stated, "The use of the
'knowing membership in the Communist Party' does
not vitiate the vice of the statute. 'rhis is so because the
has made it elear that the 'knowing' refers to
knowiug one is a member of the Party rather than as to the
knowledge of the oue being questioned as to the subversive
nature of tile Party . . . . In other words, the statute plainly
states that knmvledge of the improper nature of the Communist Party is not an ingredient.'' Petitioner also showed
that he so unclerstood the questions when he said, "I have
answered a question with regard to membership by saying
that I would not ans·wer any question with regard to membership . . . and I answered a question with regard to
knmvledge by diselaiming that I had the knowledge . . . . ''
[1] Seetion 1028.1, eonsic1er(•d as a vYholr, shows on its
facr that the Legislature, in using the words "knowing membership,'' was referring to a person's knowledge of his
membership, rather than to his knowledge of the character
of the organization. In sn bdiYision (e), when the Legislature
intended to specify knowledge of the nature of the organization, as ·well as lmowlectge of the faet of membership, it
expl!crtly re.lerred to "knmving membership" in an organization vYhich "to the knowledge of sueh employee . . . advocated'' violent overthrow of the government. In the next
subdivision, on the other hand, when the Legislature spoke
of "knowing membership" without mention of knowledge of
advoeaey, it obviously was referring only to the fact of membership and not to knowledge of the nature of the organization. 'l'he choice of language was elearly deliberate, and in
both subdivisions the words "knowing membership" were
used in the same sense of knowledge of the faet of membership.
[2] It thus was proper, under the terms of subdivision (d),
to question petitioner as to the fact of membership without
reference to hi,; knowlPllge of the charaeter of the organiza-
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and the qnestious on this
which he refused to
answer
not covered by his denials that he was lnlO'Wiugly
a membi·r with lmowledge o.f the llatm·e of the party.
The statute under vdrich
\\·as dismissed is
inntlid by the fact that it requires an employee
to answer q ncstious as to his
in the Communist
Party "IYitJwut regard to his
of the nature of the
was not because of membership
111
but because of his refu:sal to
Hot he held membership
m the
may,
matters pertaining
to the fltlJC'''" of its
on the part of
those in pnblic
to orderly and dependable ~·overJJment aml is, thercfort', relenmt to fitness
for such employment. (J>ockm.an Y. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d 676,
687
P.2rl 267] .) [6] }tiJ
's associates, as well
as his eonclnet, are faetors which may be considered by a state
ageney i•1 determining his loyalty, and information on that
sub;jeet may properly be elicited from him. (Adler v. Boarcl
of Educaiion, 342 TJ.S. 483, 492-493 [72 S.Ct. 380, 96 J.J.Ed.
517, 27 A.hH. 472] ; Poclcrnan v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676,
686-687 [249 P.2d 267) .) 1 In this connection, it has been held
that a public employer may comtitntioua1ly require its employees to disclose any past or present membership in the
Communist Party. (Garne1· v. Board of Public Works, 341
U.S. 716, 720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 9f5 IJ.Ed. 1317].) 2
[7] Statutes, snch as the one im·olvccl here, IYhich compel
diselosure of information eoncerning a public employee's
'Iu the Adler rase it was said: "Oue's assoeiatcs, past und present,
as well as one's conduct, may properly he considered in determining
fitness and loynlty. l<'rom time immemorial, one's reputation has been
dPtermined in part by the compuny he keeps. In the employment of
officials ::md teachers of the school system, the state may very properly
inquire into tho eompany they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutionul or otherwise, that preYents the state, when determining the
fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering the organizations
and peroons with whom they associate.''
2
In the Garner case, after stating that the issue was 1vhether a city
''is constitutionally forbiddrm to rCfJUire that its employees disclose
their past or present membership in the Communist Party,'' it was said:
''lYe think thnt a municipal employer is not disabled lweause it is an
agency of tl1o State from inqniring of its employees us to matters that
may proYo relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service.
Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty m:q have a
reasonuble relutionship to present and future trust. Both are commonly
inquired into in determining :fitness for both high and low positions in
priYato industry and are not less relevant in public employment.''
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membership in proscribed organizations, must be distinguished
from those \vhich provide for discharge or disqualification
because of membership or refusal to take an oath denying
membership. Under the latter type of statute, knowledge of
the character of the organizations has been held essential
(Wieman v.
344 U.S. 183 [73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed.
216] ), and the legislation has been sustained
when it
expressly or impliedly
such
v.
Boar·cl
842 U.S.
494 [72 S.Ct.
96
hEd. 517, 27 A.I1.R.2d 472] ; Garnet· v. Board
Public
n-arks, 3'11 U.S. 7H!, 723-724 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317] ;
Gerencle v. Baltimore City Board
of Elections,
341 U.S.
57 [71 S.Ct.
95 L.Ed. 745] ; Packman v.
39 Cal.2d 676, 685
P.2d 267] ; Hirschman v.
County of Los
39 Cal.2d 698, 702 [249 P.2d 287,
250 P.2d 145] ). [8] On the other hand, where the statutes
provide merely for the disclosure of information, a requirement that the employee have knowledge of the nature of the
is not necessary.
Garner v. Board of
Public W arks, 341 U.S. 716, 719-720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed.
1317] ; Adler v. Bom·cl of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492-493
[72 S.Ct. 880, 27 .A.L.R.2d 472] .)
[9] Petitioner's refusal to answer was not basecl upon ·
a claim of privilege against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution or section 13
and, aceordingly, he
of article I of the state
is precluded from relying on these constitutional provisions.
[10] It is settled that a IYitness is required to claim this
privilege, that it is a purely personal privilege,
for
the benefit of the witness and that it is deemed \Yah·ed unless
invoked. (Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 870-371
[71 S.Ct. 438, 95 hEd.
19 A.Lll.2d
) [11] Moreover, a person may properly be required to diselose information relevant to fitness and loyalty as a reasonable eondition
for obtaining or retaining public employment, even though
the disclosure, under some circumstanees, may amount to selfinenmmation. (Packman v. Leonard, 39 Ca1.2d 676, 687
[249 P.2d 267] ; Christal v. Police Corn., 33 Cal.App.2d 564,
567 et seq. [ 92 P .2d 4161 ; cf. Garner v. Boar·cl of Public
W arks, 341 U.S. 7J 6, 719-720 [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1817] ;
.Adler v. Board of Education, 842 U.S. 485, 492-493 [72
S.Ct. 380, 96 hEel. 517, 27 A.LR.2d 472] .) [12] A public
employee, of course, cannot be forced to give an answer which
may tend to incriminate him, but he may be required to
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the Supreme
Steinmetz was wrongfully discharged
cmtitled to
reinstated. This conclusion
may be reached
either of two lines of reasoning: (1) That
Dr. Steinmetz
all of the
asked of him
the
anu therefore did not violate the provisions of
section 1028.1; or, (2) that Dr. Steinmetz
of the
put to him, but the
board had no
to ask those questions because the
statute under ·which
acted was unconstitutional. (Wie344 U.S.
[73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216] ;
39 Oal.2d 676 [249 P.2c1 267]; Hirschof Los
39 Cal.2c1 698 [249 P.2c1 287,
)

the majority decision in this
's trident. The central point
of the constitutionally
against oneself. The two
are : ,
there was no violation of
or
that the statute is an arbitrary deprivation
of due process, and
unconstitutional under the
in the
In
reaching its erroneous eonelusion the majority has necessarily
impaled itself on one or more of these points.
The first contention made
Dr. Steinmetz in his petition
for a writ of mandate is that he did not violate Government
Code, section
and that his discharge for an alleged
violation of that section was therefore unlawful. No contention is made that Dr. Steinmetz refused to answer any of
the
to him
these two:
(1) "Are yon
member of the Communist
Party "
''Have yon at any time since September 10, 1948,
knowingly brrn a member of the Communist Party~''

July 1
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The rrrord shows
when asked:
1948, to and
the Communist
the forceful or violent
United States?"
Dr. Steinmetz contends
constituted au answer to 1he
It is clear either that the
did constitute an
the majority
or that the State Boanl of Education
ask the two former
because
those questions is nncomtitntiona1.
snzn·a, 344 U.S. 183; Pocknw.n v.
676; II irschman v.
Los
698.)
The controversy ce11tcrs around the
of the word
"knowingly" as used in the statute
questions asked of Dr. Steillluetz. 'l'lw
opinion
states that the word '
, '' as used in the
which Dr. Steinmetz
refused to answer, "
did not refer to knowledge of the aims of the
but
to whether he knew that he was a member . . . . "
Dr. Steinmetz contends that the
"
" referred to lmowledge of the
nature of the Communist
Party, and that he did,
answer
the negative) the
question as to membership in the
with
of its
nature.
.S.
the Supreme
u unanimous
held
that the due process clause of the Constitution of the United
States was violated by
io the membership of
state employees in certain
nnlcss such
r"cfcrTecl to membership with
of the activities an(l
purposes of the organizations to which the
belonged.
Classification of innocent membership with
membership was held to be arbitrary, nnreasonablr~ and lmCollstitutional.
Court has held
Conversely,
as to membership of
(though not unanimously) tlmt
, or in named subversive
an employee in the Communist
or assumedly the
organizations, is permissible where
inquiry is as to membership with knowledge of the nature

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
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P.2d 2671, dissenting opinmeets an even
SP(:tion
than did the loyalty oath
statute consi,lered h1 the Poekman emw. \Vithout passing upon
the
b~,hind Government Code,
this sedion is clearly a legislaof the I<lifth Amendment
States and of article I, section
of California. The section makes of
the
seeond-class ei! izen by denying to him,
exelnsion from his means of livelihood, the
refnse to
whid1 might tend to ineriminate him--a
to l'YCI'J citizen by the
Constitutions of the United States and of California.
ln the
court counsel for Dr. Steinagainst self-ineriminametz
Pifth Amendment argument
Dr. Steinmetz's answers
incriminating, he was entitled
on
the l<lifth Amendment, and its
California
. to avoid a trap for perjury
set
those with suft1cient influence to have him summoned .
. . " That he did invoke that privilege at the hearing, is
sho1vn in the
of his t0stimony which is quoted
later in this
Th0 Ji'ifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
in
that "No per;;;on . . . shall be comStates
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
be
of l
property, withont due
This amendment \Yas adoptrcl in 1791.
our Constitution provides
that "No person shall . . . be comcase,
be a witness against himself;
pelled, in
liberty, or property without due
nor be
''
process of law;
'l'he proper
of thrse constitutional provisions
enactment can best be understood b~'
to a modern
them in the baekgronnd of their historical developin about tlw year 1236 A.D. in England,
ment.
there were ecclesiastical courts which took upon themselves
mueh of the burden of
various <lisputes. It was the
of these courts to snbmit persons called before them
to an "oath ex officio." If the persons summoned to appear
did not do so,
were excommunicated; if they did appear
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were foreed to
the private sins of
sc;hooled in the common
person to furnish his own
oath, was
to
accused began to
man on trial could not
would disclose his
absolute. 'When a
to identify himself
pressly admitting that he was
was asked how he would
penalty depended upon the
he was charged. H treason or a
he ~was treated
as if he had pleaded
if a
prison with a meager allowance of bread and water. Later,
in addition to the bread and 1vater
to torture, which either killed him or indm~ed him within a
period of an hour or so, to plead either
or not guilty.
'fhis horrible and barbaric praetiee was not discontinued until
1772. At that time a statnte was em1cted which provided
that if a person stood mute on his
of piracy or
felony, he should be convictrd and the conrt should award
judgment and rxecution as if he had bePn eonvictrd
verdict
or confession. In 1827, hovvcver,
mnte in any criminal case was by statute (7 & 8
made the
of a plea of not guilty.
'fhis, then, was the background 1n
which led our
forefathers to the firm conviction that no man should be
compelled to testify against himse1f.
If one is asked questions abont
tlw
way
of looking at his refusal to ans',n'r Js that he
must
know something about it or rlse
would hr rrfuse to
answer? In other words. it is saicl that the refusal to answer
g·ives rise to an infrrence of'
of
But the
only thing which is sure is that the witnrss l1as rrfnsecl to
answer. There are no less than three inf('rences vYhich may
be drawn from such a rrfusal to
: ( 1) 'l'bat the witness
is guilty; (2) that he knows
or some
which
might tend to incriminate him: and ( 3) that he refusrc1 to
answer because he frrls that the
has no
or
business, to ask him such
If we go back to the
common law as it finally developed, we find that standing
mute, in legal effect, pleads not guilty. How can standing
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llan·

ie ;•eJJsnre 'rhid1
he bas elltOUJJtere<1 because of
ealle(\ before an inIf he told all t lwt lw \ronld be
ng to
lw \Hlttl(l haY(' 1mi\·e<1 the claim of tho
aJH1 conlcl not rpfm;e to
other
his friends. It ma,r aho lw tnw ihat th<'
witness lms 110 fin;t-haml
of the Cowmm1ist Party
11ot \I'<Ult them to be

whir·b are of he
auy organizations of an,,- i.nw.
that he is a
loyal American wllo believes that the
recent rash of scenrity iHY\'SLigat ions, Joyaltr
~nspieion
awl di:.;tnt8t has
tlw bou
of iJH1iYidna1
librrty and pel'sonal
estab!i;.;hed b,,- i he framers of
or of any olller
tlwt be has

IH'\'Cl'

our state and natiollal Constitutions. B'rom liis :stw1irs of
Fnitrd States
and of the C'onstitlli
he knows that
the goV<'l'llment has 110 right to inrjltire into his
e beliefs
and as:soeiai icms Hllll'ss lltr)' eonstitute a t·lPar a]](1
danger to thn
of the
\Ylt ic~l1 his beliefs and
assoriatiuns obYions1~- l1o not. fip kuows th<:t his
to
freedom of
tho11gllt, religion and
ma;- Hot
be abridged by thn Congress or by ihe :stah· Legislature. lin
knows tbat be may uot arbitraril.\' be
of li k liberty
or propert~'. He feels that the inwstigntion in 1Yhid1 hl• is
inyoh-ed is not in areord with the spi 1·it Yrll ieh permrates
tlte Constit utioll, Hml that to mrekl:· state his imwceHec: would
be, in effect, c~oopl•rating ·with those who ~would
or
impair tile cJredinw•ss of 1he ConstitnLion atHl the Bill of
HightN. He
al;.;o, that if he. an
innocent
person, opposes this inYae>ion into his libcri
the wwonstitlllion:1l natnn• of the inwsti~;ation and of the antlwrity
H]J(1er which
is eon<lude(l \\'ill br forecfully brought home
to the public, nncl that it will provide the• <·ourts 1vith a dear
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Since
without
process
I<'onrteenth Amemhnent to the
of law
United States Constitution.
, there
a
of many unmembers of the
that a witness who
invokes
constitutional
to testify is
disloyal, or is
were
to uncover. '"l'here can be no
consequences visited upon a person excluded from
In the view of the comhas become a badge
in time of cold
and hot
emotions when 'each man
to eye his
as a
possible enemy.' . . . To thus inhibit indiYidual freedom of
movement is to stifle the fio,v of demoeratic
and
at one of its chief sources. . . . '' (IV icman v.
Updegraff, supra, 344 U.S.
) I belieYe that two statements made under oath
Dr. Steinmetz at the same hearing
where he purportedly refused to answPr two of the questions
those who read this
of the investigating board should
opinion to determine whether Dr. Steinmetz is or is not a
loyal
and
he at first refused to answer the disputed
Dr. Steinmetz first stated under oath: " . . . I should like
publicly to reaffirm that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the
State of California against all
foreign and domestic;
and that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the Con-
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me to

to the

been
according
wisdom and
and
as the

even if the
answering in
set by those
employee,
him summoned in the first
with sufficient influence to
place, seeks to use the Bill of
"Now, ladies and
I believe that no legislation
is valid that incorporates such a
attempt to circumvent the Constitution. Behavior allowed by the U. S.
Constituiion cannot
by a state on the
grounds that it is
when the behavior is
duties of a subordinate . . . .
''. . . I have been summoned to interrogation of a judicial
type because I am a public educator but not for anything that
I have done as either an educator or a public employee.
Indeed, there being no charge
me the situation is
utterly paradoxical, so it should not be
advantage if
I were to demand or attempt an explanation. However, since
you find none necessary I find it sufficient at the moment
simply to point out this fact . . . . I am sure that all of you
members believe in a government of law and not of men,
and a
with a clear separation of powers as provided by the
and I am sure you have probably
sworn au oath necessitating such convictions. You must then
recognize that the assumption or
of judicial powers
by or to a legislative committee, or executive agency, or policy
commission such as yours is unconstitutional and, if I may
add, I think in my opinion subversive to the Bill of Rights.
''The California Legislature has mistakenly authorized you
to ask questions that are accusing in effect especially when
directed to an individual; questions permitting of but one
answer such as usually characterized police state questions;
questions that as in my case are totally unnecessary if they
are legal because their proper answer is already known so
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; quesbeen answered and questions which
to
rather than

no motive
new law.
so much as
from the standpoint
with a profound
viewpoint is less
the descendant of

me.
a free press, an instructive
and
and every other manifestation
of cnlt uee in America.
these
of vaunted political
for freedom in the \V estern \Vorld I contend that
arc jeopardized by
its sacrifice.
summoned for public
humiliation awl told
th0 act nm1rr which you are proceedthat I cannot use the Bill of
to avoid jeopardy
enemirs then no man is safe from those in
power, indeed then no secret will be safe and
may cease to be temporary and become totalicitizen ean find satisfaetion in
or private, who ean hold
him un(1er eonstant threat for politieal dissent. Publie emceases to be either right or privilege or duty an
under such cireumstances. . . . [I] t is really the
~"''"'n'""Q of the law that threatens. And I oppose
and shall eontirme to oppose it if it is
Court passes upon it . . . . "
Ont> nmst be im1c>c>d naive if he cannot see the parallel
between Hw
of Dr. Steinmetz before this investigatboarc1.
witness ealled before the ecclesiastical
eourt or Star
in England in the 15th, 16th or 17th
centuries. The very evils which prompted an early Congress
to add to our Constitution the proteetion of the Bill of

